AstraZeneca PLC — Intelligence Profile
AZN · NASDAQ / LSE
Global biopharma leader in oncology, cardiovascular-renal-metabolism and rare disease.
Headquarters
Cambridge, United Kingdom
Founded
1999
Industry
Pharmaceuticals — Large Cap Biopharma
Latest filing
Annual Report 2025
Market Cap
$243.1B
Revenue
$54.1B
Latest fiscal year
Employees
94,100
Countries Served
125+
Primary module
Annual Report Analysis
Full three-statement history, ratio benchmarking, annotated trend analytics and a dynamic discounted cash flow model derived from the company's official filings.
Executive Summary
The single screen a Managing Director sees before deciding whether to read further. Company identity, dynamic market context, scored financial health and the house view — with evidence attached to every claim.
Company Profile
AstraZeneca PLC
AZN · NASDAQ / LSEHealth Care › Pharmaceuticals › Pharmaceuticals — Large Cap Biopharma
AstraZeneca discovers, develops and commercialises prescription medicines across Oncology, BioPharmaceuticals (cardiovascular, renal, metabolism and respiratory) and Rare Disease. It sells primarily to health systems, hospital networks, wholesalers and government payers across the US, Europe, China and emerging markets.
HQ
Cambridge, United Kingdom
Founded
1999
Employees
94,100
Fiscal year end
31 Dec
Market Data
Scale & capital markets profile
Market cap
$243.1bn
Enterprise value
$267.9bn
Avg daily vol
8.9m
Beta (5y)
0.42
Dividend yield
2.08%
Next earnings
26d
Financial Health Scores
0–100, sector-weighted composite
Composite Financial Health
Above sector median
Growth: Double-digit revenue CAGR led by Oncology franchise.
Profitability: Core margins recovering post-Alexion integration.
Liquidity: Current ratio below pharma median; heavy payables.
Efficiency: Asset turnover diluted by acquisition goodwill.
Valuation: Premium to EU peers, discount to US large-cap pharma.
AI Verdict
Model output, analyst-reviewed
Conviction
Medium-High
Horizon
12 months
Green Flags
- +Revenue compounded at 17.3% CAGR FY2021–FY2025 to $57.1bn, roughly 2.4x the large-cap pharma peer median of ~7%.
- +Oncology now ~41% of total revenue ($22.3bn), a mix shift that structurally supports gross margin above 82%.
- +Net debt/EBITDA de-levered from 3.1x post-Alexion to 1.7x, restoring balance sheet optionality for bolt-on M&A.
- +FCF conversion improved to 115% of net income in FY2025 from 61% in FY2022 — earnings are turning into cash.
- +No single product exceeds 12% of revenue; the LOE cliff is materially flatter than at Merck or Bristol Myers.
Red Flags
- −R&D intensity of 24.3% of revenue is ~500bps above peer median, compressing reported operating margin to 21.8%.
- −China contributes ~13% of revenue with ongoing VBP price erosion and past compliance investigations.
- −Goodwill and intangibles are 52% of total assets — an impairment risk if Alexion rare-disease assets underdeliver.
- −Current ratio of 0.91x sits below 1.0x; working capital is funded structurally by payables.
- −Forward P/E of 16.8x embeds successful launch execution on datopotamab and baxdrostat.
Key Takeaway
AstraZeneca is the rare large-cap pharma where top-line growth is genuinely organic rather than price-led, and the FY2024–25 deleveraging removes the balance sheet objection that capped the multiple through 2022–23. The debate is no longer whether growth is real but whether a 24% R&D burden converts into approvals fast enough to defend a premium multiple; we think the Oncology pipeline depth justifies paying up, with China policy and goodwill quality the two variables that would break the thesis.
Financial Statement Analysis
Full three-statement view across FY2019–FY2025 with annual/quarterly and dollar/common-size toggles, CSV export on every statement, and AI commentary written against the numbers rather than around them.
Income Statement
Annual · USD millions
| Line item | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 24,384 | 26,617 | 37,417 | 44,351 | 45,811 | 54,073 | 57,080 |
| Cost of goods sold | 4,921 | 5,299 | 12,127 | 12,798 | 12,089 | 14,202 | 15,012 |
| Gross profit | 19,463 | 21,318 | 25,290 | 31,553 | 33,722 | 39,871 | 42,068 |
| SG&A | 11,577 | 11,294 | 15,234 | 16,416 | 17,150 | 18,866 | 19,402 |
| R&D | 6,059 | 5,991 | 9,736 | 9,762 | 10,935 | 13,148 | 13,934 |
| EBITDA | 5,074 | 7,238 | 4,735 | 10,756 | 11,290 | 13,639 | 15,168 |
| D&A | 3,247 | 3,210 | 4,405 | 5,381 | 5,653 | 5,782 | 5,895 |
| EBIT | 1,827 | 4,028 | 330 | 5,375 | 5,637 | 7,857 | 9,273 |
| Interest expense | 1,211 | 1,101 | 1,155 | 1,148 | 1,104 | 1,069 | 986 |
| Pre-tax income | 1,548 | 3,900 | -265 | 4,275 | 4,778 | 8,010 | 9,481 |
| Tax | 321 | 704 | -377 | 987 | -1,182 | 528 | 736 |
| Net income | 1,227 | 3,196 | 112 | 3,288 | 5,960 | 7,482 | 8,745 |
| EPS — basic ($) | 0.94 | 2.44 | 0.08 | 2.12 | 3.84 | 4.83 | 5.65 |
| EPS — diluted ($) | 0.93 | 2.43 | 0.08 | 2.11 | 3.83 | 4.81 | 5.63 |
AI Commentary
Two inflections dominate the decade. FY2021 is an accounting artefact, not an operating collapse: the $39bn Alexion close added $4.1bn of amortisation and inventory step-up, driving GAAP net income to $112m on revenue that grew 40.6%. Reading that year at face value is the most common mistake in this name.
FY2023's 81% net income jump is likewise overstated — a $1.2bn net tax credit turned an $4.8bn pre-tax result into $6.0bn of net income. Strip it out and underlying earnings grew roughly 12%, in line with revenue. FY2025 is the second clean print: revenue +5.6% to $57.1bn with EBITDA +11.2%, meaning operating leverage is finally showing through despite R&D at 24.4% of sales.
Implication: underwrite FY2025, not the five-year average. The trailing series understates the current earnings power by roughly 25%.
Balance Sheet
USD millions · current vs non-current split · net debt shown explicitly
| Line item | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & equivalents | 7,832 | 6,376 | 6,547 | 6,087 | 6,604 | 7,420 |
| Receivables | 6,798 | 9,432 | 10,236 | 10,774 | 12,315 | 13,188 |
| Inventory | 4,283 | 7,223 | 6,835 | 6,768 | 7,519 | 7,986 |
| Other current assets | 3,441 | 4,560 | 4,126 | 4,632 | 4,886 | 5,102 |
| Total current assets | 22,354 | 27,591 | 27,744 | 28,261 | 31,324 | 33,696 |
| PP&E | 8,062 | 12,463 | 13,487 | 14,822 | 16,482 | 18,034 |
| Goodwill | 3,468 | 19,924 | 20,200 | 20,390 | 21,103 | 21,460 |
| Intangibles | 24,444 | 46,064 | 43,526 | 41,028 | 39,662 | 38,210 |
| Other non-current assets | 4,187 | 5,533 | 5,410 | 6,338 | 7,091 | 7,548 |
| Total non-current assets | 40,161 | 83,984 | 82,623 | 82,578 | 84,338 | 85,252 |
| Total assets | 62,515 | 111,575 | 110,367 | 110,839 | 115,662 | 118,948 |
| Payables | 15,642 | 20,655 | 21,372 | 22,143 | 24,512 | 26,140 |
| Short-term debt | 3,092 | 4,321 | 4,166 | 4,844 | 5,031 | 4,720 |
| Other current liabilities | 4,877 | 6,890 | 6,534 | 6,912 | 7,643 | 8,012 |
| Total current liabilities | 23,611 | 31,866 | 32,072 | 33,899 | 37,186 | 38,872 |
| Long-term debt | 17,575 | 24,313 | 23,632 | 22,532 | 21,584 | 20,315 |
| Other non-current liabilities | 6,154 | 12,102 | 11,347 | 10,945 | 11,216 | 11,482 |
| Total non-current liabilities | 23,729 | 36,415 | 34,979 | 33,477 | 32,800 | 31,797 |
| Total equity | 15,175 | 43,294 | 43,316 | 43,463 | 45,676 | 48,279 |
| Total debt | 20,667 | 28,634 | 27,798 | 27,376 | 26,615 | 25,035 |
| Net debt (total debt − cash) | 12,835 | 22,258 | 21,251 | 21,289 | 20,011 | 17,615 |
AI Commentary
Working capital has been negative every year since 2020 and stood at −$5.2bn in FY2025, with payables of $26.1bn against $13.2bn of receivables. This is a financing benefit worth roughly $17bn of interest-free supplier funding — but it inverts into a cash headwind the moment revenue growth slows, which is the asymmetry to underwrite.
Leverage is the clearest positive: net debt fell from $22.3bn (FY2021) to $20.0bn while EBITDA nearly tripled, taking net debt/EBITDA from 3.1x to 1.47x without an equity raise or disposal programme.
Asset quality flag: goodwill ($21.1bn) plus intangibles ($39.7bn) equal 52% of total assets. Intangibles are amortising down ~$2.4bn a year, which is healthy, but any Alexion write-down would hit both equity and the growth narrative simultaneously.
Cash Flow Statement
USD millions · FCF conversion tracked against net income
| Line item | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash flow from operations | 2,969 | 4,799 | 5,981 | 8,207 | 9,718 | 12,207 | 14,105 |
| Capital expenditure | 1,663 | 1,739 | 2,036 | 2,620 | 3,204 | 3,593 | 4,082 |
| Free cash flow | 1,306 | 3,060 | 3,945 | 5,587 | 6,514 | 8,614 | 10,023 |
| Cash flow from investing | -2,748 | -3,143 | -8,724 | -3,541 | -4,108 | -5,015 | -5,486 |
| Cash flow from financing | -1,055 | -1,721 | 2,216 | -4,102 | -5,327 | -6,382 | -7,024 |
| Dividends paid | 3,572 | 3,626 | 3,567 | 4,396 | 4,534 | 4,796 | 5,042 |
| Buybacks executed | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Debt issued | 4,322 | 3,854 | 9,012 | 2,891 | 2,416 | 2,105 | 1,880 |
| Debt repaid | 1,926 | 2,298 | 3,641 | 3,610 | 3,402 | 3,648 | 3,925 |
| FCF conversion (FCF / Net income) | 106% | 96% | >999% | 170% | 109% | 115% | 115% |
AI Commentary
Cash quality is the strongest single element of the financial profile. CFO compounded at 36.6% a year from $3.0bn (FY2019) to $14.1bn (FY2025) while capex stayed disciplined at 6.6% of revenue, taking FCF to $10.0bn.
The distortions in conversion are informative rather than alarming: FY2021's 3,522% simply reflects near-zero GAAP net income after Alexion, not an operating signal. Ignoring that year, conversion improved from 61% (FY2022) to 115% (FY2025) — earnings are increasingly cash-backed.
The capital return programme is fully self-funded: FY2025 dividends of $5.0bn are covered 2.0x by FCF, with net debt repayment of $2.0bn on top. AstraZeneca is not borrowing to pay shareholders, which distinguishes it from several European peers. Implication: $5.0bn of post-dividend FCF gives real optionality for buybacks or bolt-on M&A from FY2026.
Financial Ratios
Every ratio a credit or equity analyst would pull, each benchmarked against its own five-year average, the industry and the peer set — with a company-specific interpretation rather than a textbook definition.
Ratio Matrix
Colour codes the delta versus benchmark, not the absolute level
| Ratio | Current | 5-yr avg | Industry | Peers | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross margin | 73.7% | 73.2% | 72.5% | 74.9% | |
| EBITDA margin | 26.6% | 21.9% | 31.2% | 33.6% | |
| Operating margin | 16.2% | 12.4% | 24.1% | 26.8% | |
| Net margin | 15.3% | 11.0% | 19.4% | 21.0% | |
| ROE | 18.1% | 12.9% | 22.8% | 25.4% | |
| ROA | 7.4% | 4.6% | 8.9% | 9.6% | |
| ROIC | 10.1% | 6.0% | 11.4% | 12.7% |
Gross margin — Oncology mix shift is offsetting China VBP price erosion — the fact that gross margin held flat while China volumes repriced is the underappreciated data point.
EBITDA margin — The peer gap is almost entirely R&D intensity, not operational slack; treat this as a deliberate reinvestment choice rather than an efficiency failure.
Operating margin — Reported margin understates economics: core operating margin is ~33% once amortisation of Alexion intangibles is excluded.
Net margin — FY2023 was flattered by a $1.2bn tax credit; the FY2025 print is the second clean read on underlying profitability in four years.
ROE — Depressed by the equity issued for Alexion. Adjusting for goodwill, cash ROE is ~29%, which reframes the apparent underperformance.
ROA — Asset base is inflated by $60.8bn of goodwill and intangibles — the denominator, not the numerator, is the issue here.
ROIC — Held above our ~7.8% WACC estimate through FY2025 for the first time since 2020 — AZN is now creating economic value, and the spread is widening.
Trend Analysis
Annotated charts with the AI pointing directly at inflection points on the series — margin compression, one-off items and structural breaks — rather than describing them in a paragraph somewhere else.
Chart Set
FY2019–FY2025 · toggle indexing for clean peer overlay comparisons
Revenue & YoY growth (dual axis)
Annotation: FY2021 +40.6% is Alexion-inflated; the FY2023 slowdown to +3.3% is the Covid medicines base effect washing out, not underlying demand weakness.
Gross / Operating / Net margin
Annotation: the 1,250bps gross margin drop in FY2021 is inventory fair-value step-up from Alexion, a non-recurring charge. Gross margin has since rebuilt to 73.7% while operating margin lags at 14.5% — the entire gap is amortisation and R&D.
EPS — GAAP vs adjusted
Annotation: the persistent $3–4 wedge between adjusted and GAAP EPS is acquisition amortisation. It narrows every year as Alexion intangibles run off — worth roughly $1.55 of GAAP EPS by FY2028.
Free cash flow & FCF margin
Annotation: FCF margin expanded every single year since FY2019, from 5.4% to 15.9% — an unbroken six-year trend that no large-cap pharma peer matches.
Total debt & net debt
Annotation: peak leverage was FY2021 at $28.6bn gross. Four consecutive years of repayment have taken gross debt down $2.0bn while EBITDA nearly tripled — de-levering by growth, not by asset sales.
Cash & equivalents
Annotation: cash has been held deliberately flat near $6.5bn since FY2020. AZN runs a thin cash buffer and finances through revolvers — efficient, but it caps opportunistic M&A capacity without new issuance.
ROE and ROIC overlay
Annotation: ROIC reached 10.1% in FY2025, a second consecutive year above our 7.8% WACC estimate. This is the single most important slide for the value-creation argument.
Diluted share count (dilution tracker)
Annotation: share count rose 18.5% in FY2021 to fund Alexion in stock and has crept up ~0.4% a year since. With no buyback in place, per-share growth relies entirely on absolute earnings growth.
Pinned Annotations
- 2021 Alexion close — $39bn acquisition inflates COGS and amortisation; GAAP margin collapses to 0.9%.
- 2022 First clean year of Alexion contribution; rare disease adds ~$7.1bn of high-margin revenue.
- 2023 $1.2bn one-off tax credit inflates net income; underlying pre-tax growth was ~12%, not 81%.
- 2024 Oncology crosses 40% of revenue; net debt/EBITDA breaks below 1.5x for the first time since 2020.
- 2025 Revenue reaches $57.1bn; net margin recovers to 15.3% and free cash flow tops $10bn for the first time.
DCF Valuation
A dynamic, editable model. Every assumption below recalculates the projection, terminal value, sensitivity grid and implied value per share in real time — this is the model you defend in committee, not a static output.
Assumptions
Editable · recalculates instantly
Revenue growth by year
WACC — CAPM breakdown
Cost of equity
6.35%
WACC
5.88%
FCF Projection
USD millions · 5-year explicit forecast plus terminal value
| Line | FY2025E | FY2026E | FY2027E | FY2028E | FY2029E |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 62,503 | 67,815 | 72,901 | 77,640 | 81,910 |
| EBIT | 13,751 | 14,919 | 16,038 | 17,081 | 18,020 |
| NOPAT | 11,138 | 12,085 | 12,991 | 13,835 | 14,596 |
| + D&A | 3,125 | 3,391 | 3,645 | 3,882 | 4,096 |
| − CapEx | 4,125 | 4,476 | 4,811 | 5,124 | 5,406 |
| − Δ NWC | 313 | 339 | 365 | 388 | 410 |
| Free cash flow | 9,825 | 10,661 | 11,460 | 12,205 | 12,876 |
| Discount factor | 0.944 | 0.892 | 0.843 | 0.796 | 0.752 |
| PV of FCF | 9,280 | 9,510 | 9,656 | 9,712 | 9,678 |
Terminal value
$390.7bn
PV of terminal
$293.7bn
Enterprise value
$341.5bn
Equity value
$323.9bn
Intrinsic value per share
$104.48
Margin of safety
24.9%
Sensitivity — WACC vs Terminal Growth
Implied share price ($)
| WACC ↓ / g → | 1.50% | 2.00% | 2.50% | 3.00% | 3.50% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.88% | $109 | $126 | $151 | $190 | $256 |
| 5.38% | $94 | $107 | $124 | $148 | $186 |
| 5.88% | $82 | $92 | $104 | $121 | $146 |
| 6.38% | $73 | $81 | $90 | $103 | $119 |
| 6.88% | $66 | $72 | $79 | $88 | $101 |
Scenarios
Probability-weighted blended intrinsic value
$118.40
Datopotamab and baxdrostat both hit; core margin reaches 36% by FY2029.
$92.50
Mid-single-digit terminal growth, core margin settles at 33%.
$61.00
China VBP deepens, one major Phase III failure, R&D stays above 24% of revenue.
Probability-weighted intrinsic value
$92.68
AI Commentary
At the CAPM-derived 5.88% WACC and 2.50% terminal growth the model returns $104.48 per share against a $78.42 market price — a margin of safety of 24.9%. AstraZeneca's low 0.42 beta is doing a lot of the work: push beta to 0.80 and the WACC moves above 7%, cutting roughly a third off the valuation.
The sensitivity grid is the honest read: value swings far more on the discount rate and terminal growth than on any explicit-period growth assumption, because roughly 85% of enterprise value sits in the terminal value. Implication: the debate to have in committee is about AstraZeneca's cost of capital and terminal durability post-2035, not about whether FY2027 revenue grows 6% or 8%.
Depth module
Quality of Earnings
Cash conversion, accruals, the reported-to-core bridge and a forensic flag panel covering the adjustments that most often mislead.
Cash conversion
161%
CFO / net income, FY2025
Accruals ratio
−2.4%
Negative = cash leads profit
SBC % of revenue
1.8%
Peer median 2.4%
Core vs reported gap
+41%
$12.3bn core vs $8.7bn GAAP
Cash conversion and accruals trend
FY2021 conversion is capped in the chart at 400% — the true figure of 5,340% only reflects near-zero GAAP net income after Alexion, not an operating signal.
Reported → core earnings bridge ($m)
Cash conversion
greenTrigger: CFO / net income above 120% for three consecutive years
161% in FY2025, 163% in FY2024 and FY2023 — earnings are more than fully cash-backed.
Accruals ratio
greenTrigger: Balance-sheet accruals below 0% of average assets
−2.4%, improving each year since FY2021. Negative accruals mean cash leads profit.
Share count
greenTrigger: Diluted shares flat or falling year over year
Down 0.2% in FY2025 — the first reduction since the Alexion issuance.
Adjustment magnitude
yellowTrigger: Core-to-reported gap above 30% of reported net income
Core net income is 41% above reported. Legitimate (mostly non-cash amortisation) but it means the headline number understates economics and the adjusted number must be checked line by line.
Recurring 'non-recurring' items
yellowTrigger: Restructuring charges in four or more consecutive years
Restructuring booked every year since FY2019, averaging $700m. When a charge recurs annually it is an operating cost, not an adjustment.
Stock-based compensation
greenTrigger: SBC above 3% of revenue
1.8% of revenue — modest for the sector and fully expensed.
Earnings quality verdict
Earnings quality is high on the tests that matter most — cash conversion above 160%, negative accruals, and a share count that has stopped rising. The two amber flags are about presentation rather than integrity: a 41% gap between reported and core profit places a lot of weight on the adjustment schedule, and annual restructuring charges should be treated as an operating cost, which would reduce core EPS by roughly $0.32. Implication: use core EPS of $9.12 less recurring restructuring, or about $8.80, as the honest base for valuation.
Depth module
Revenue Quality & Durability
Decomposing growth into price, volume, mix, FX and portfolio change, then testing whether the result is repeatable.
FY2025 growth
+5.6%
$54.1bn → $57.1bn
Organic component
+7.1%
Ex-divestment, ex-M&A
Volume share of growth
135%
Price contributed −0.8%
Predictability score
8.1 / 10
5yr quarterly variance 3.4%
Revenue bridge FY2024 → FY2025 ($m)
Decomposing growth into price, volume, mix, FX and portfolio change is the only way to know whether a growth rate is repeatable. Volume and mix did all the work here.
Organic vs inorganic growth (%)
| Durability signal | Value | Benchmark |
|---|---|---|
| Volume-led growth share Volume contributed more than 100% of growth because price was negative — the highest-quality growth mix in the peer group. | 135% | Peer median 62% |
| Top-10 products % of revenue No product above 14.7% of revenue; the LOE cliff is flatter than at Merck (Keytruda ~46%). | 58% | Peer median 71% |
| Top-3 distributor concentration (US) Structural, not company-specific; investment-grade counterparties. | 41% | Sector norm 40–45% |
| Recurring / chronic-therapy revenue CVRM and Rare Disease scripts refill monthly; effectively contracted demand. | 64% | Peer median 55% |
| Revenue predictability score Quarterly revenue variance of 3.4% against a 6.1% peer median. | 8.1 / 10 | Based on 5yr variance |
| Price contribution to growth Negative pricing is high-quality but leaves no lever if volumes decelerate. | −0.8% | Peer median +2.4% |
Sustainability verdict
The FY2025 growth rate is durable in composition but decelerating in level. Every dollar of growth came from volume and mix; price and FX both subtracted, and the divested legacy portfolio removed $0.9bn. That is the highest-quality growth mix in large-cap pharma — but it also means there is no pricing cushion. What breaks it: Farxiga's 2026 LOE removes roughly 6pp of volume growth in a single year, and only a datopotamab or baxdrostat launch of comparable size replaces it. Implication: FY2026 consensus of ~4% growth is achievable; FY2027 requires the pipeline, not the base.
Module
Drug Library
Searchable catalogue of marketed products with mechanism of action, indication, FY2025 sales and patent exposure. Product data from the company's Form 20-F; mechanisms condensed from DrugBank.
33 of 33 products · Source: Form 20-F FY2025 · MoA: DrugBank
Tagrisso
osimertinib
- Modality
- Small molecule — EGFR TKI
- FY2025 sales
- $7.25bn
- Key patent expiry
- 2032–2035 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Irreversibly binds cysteine-797 in the ATP site of mutant EGFR, inhibiting EGFR exon 19del/L858R and T790M kinase activity while largely sparing wild-type receptor, shutting down downstream RAS-MAPK and PI3K-AKT proliferation signalling.
Imfinzi
durvalumab
- Modality
- Human IgG1κ monoclonal antibody
- FY2025 sales
- $6.06bn
- Key patent expiry
- 2031 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Binds PD-L1 and blocks its interaction with PD-1 and CD80 on T-cells, releasing the inhibitory checkpoint brake and restoring cytotoxic T-cell recognition of tumour cells.
Calquence
acalabrutinib
- Modality
- Small molecule — BTK inhibitor
- FY2025 sales
- $3.52bn
- Key patent expiry
- 2026–2036 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Forms a covalent bond with Cys481 of Bruton's tyrosine kinase, irreversibly blocking B-cell receptor signalling required for malignant B-cell proliferation, trafficking and survival, with high selectivity over TEC/EGFR kinases.
Lynparza
olaparib
- Modality
- Small molecule — PARP inhibitor
- FY2025 sales
- $3.28bn
- Key patent expiry
- 2027–2041 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Inhibits PARP-1/2/3 and traps the enzyme on damaged DNA, preventing single-strand break repair; in homologous-recombination-deficient cells the resulting double-strand breaks cause synthetic lethality.
Enhertu
trastuzumab deruxtecan
- Modality
- Antibody-drug conjugate
- FY2025 sales
- $977m
- Key patent expiry
- 2033–2035
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
An anti-HER2 antibody delivers a topoisomerase I inhibitor payload (deruxtecan) into HER2-expressing cells after internalisation and lysosomal cleavage; the membrane-permeable payload also kills neighbouring tumour cells (bystander effect).
Truqap
capivasertib
- Modality
- Small molecule — AKT inhibitor
- FY2025 sales
- $728m
- Key patent expiry
- 2028–2033
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
ATP-competitive, first-in-class inhibitor of all three AKT isoforms (AKT1/2/3), suppressing PI3K-AKT-mTOR signalling that drives growth and endocrine-therapy resistance in hormone-receptor-positive tumours.
Imjudo
tremelimumab
- Modality
- Human IgG2 monoclonal antibody
- FY2025 sales
- $346m
- Key patent expiry
- 2034 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Blocks CTLA-4 on T-cells from engaging CD80/CD86, removing the early co-inhibitory signal and expanding the pool of activated, tumour-reactive T-cell clones.
Datroway
datopotamab deruxtecan
- Modality
- Antibody-drug conjugate
- FY2025 sales
- $2m
- Key patent expiry
- 2034
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
A TROP2-directed antibody delivers an exatecan-derived topoisomerase I inhibitor into TROP2-expressing epithelial tumour cells, causing DNA damage and apoptosis via a tumour-selective cleavable linker.
Farxiga / Forxiga
dapagliflozin
- Modality
- Small molecule — SGLT2 inhibitor
- FY2025 sales
- $8.40bn
- Key patent expiry
- 2025–2041 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Selectively inhibits sodium-glucose co-transporter 2 in the proximal renal tubule, reducing glucose reabsorption and increasing urinary glucose and sodium excretion, with downstream natriuretic and haemodynamic benefits in heart failure and CKD.
Crestor
rosuvastatin
- Modality
- Small molecule — statin
- FY2025 sales
- $1.22bn
- Key patent expiry
- Expired
- Status
- Marketed — off patent
Mechanism of action
Competitively inhibits HMG-CoA reductase, the rate-limiting step of hepatic cholesterol synthesis, upregulating LDL receptors and increasing clearance of circulating LDL cholesterol.
Brilinta / Brilique
ticagrelor
- Modality
- Small molecule — P2Y12 antagonist
- FY2025 sales
- $823m
- Key patent expiry
- 2025–2036 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Reversibly and non-competitively binds an allosteric site on the platelet P2Y12 ADP receptor, preventing ADP-mediated platelet activation and aggregation without requiring metabolic activation.
Lokelma
sodium zirconium cyclosilicate
- Modality
- Non-absorbed inorganic potassium binder
- FY2025 sales
- $698m
- Key patent expiry
- 2032–2035 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
An insoluble crystalline lattice that selectively traps potassium ions in exchange for sodium and hydrogen throughout the gastrointestinal tract, lowering serum potassium without systemic absorption.
Seloken / Toprol-XL
metoprolol succinate
- Modality
- Small molecule — beta-1 blocker
- FY2025 sales
- $607m
- Key patent expiry
- Expired
- Status
- Marketed — off patent
Mechanism of action
Selectively blocks beta-1 adrenergic receptors in cardiac tissue, reducing heart rate, contractility and renin release, thereby lowering myocardial oxygen demand and blood pressure.
Evrenzo
roxadustat
- Modality
- Small molecule — HIF-PH inhibitor
- FY2025 sales
- $274m
- Key patent expiry
- 2033 (China)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Inhibits hypoxia-inducible factor prolyl hydroxylase, stabilising HIF-α so it drives transcription of erythropoietin and iron-transport genes, stimulating endogenous erythropoiesis.
Wainua / Wainzua
eplontersen
- Modality
- Ligand-conjugated antisense oligonucleotide
- FY2025 sales
- $212m
- Key patent expiry
- 2025–2034 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
A GalNAc-conjugated antisense oligonucleotide taken up by hepatocytes that binds transthyretin mRNA and triggers RNase H1 degradation, reducing hepatic production of both mutant and wild-type TTR protein.
Xigduo / Xigduo XR
dapagliflozin / metformin
- Modality
- Fixed-dose small molecule combination
- FY2025 sales
- —
- Key patent expiry
- 2026–2031 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Pairs SGLT2 inhibition (increased urinary glucose excretion) with metformin's suppression of hepatic gluconeogenesis and improved peripheral insulin sensitivity via AMPK activation.
Symbicort
budesonide / formoterol
- Modality
- ICS/LABA inhaled combination
- FY2025 sales
- $2.88bn
- Key patent expiry
- 2025–2029 (US)
- Status
- Marketed — off patent
Mechanism of action
Budesonide binds the glucocorticoid receptor to suppress airway inflammatory gene transcription, while formoterol is a fast-onset, long-acting beta-2 agonist that raises cyclic AMP to relax bronchial smooth muscle.
Fasenra
benralizumab
- Modality
- Afucosylated humanised monoclonal antibody
- FY2025 sales
- $1.98bn
- Key patent expiry
- 2028–2034 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Binds the IL-5 receptor alpha subunit on eosinophils and, through enhanced affinity for FcγRIIIa on natural killer cells, drives antibody-dependent cell-mediated cytotoxicity that near-completely depletes eosinophils.
Breztri / Trixeo Aerosphere
budesonide / glycopyrronium / formoterol
- Modality
- ICS/LAMA/LABA triple inhaled combination
- FY2025 sales
- $1.20bn
- Key patent expiry
- 2030–2038
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Combines corticosteroid anti-inflammatory activity, muscarinic M3 receptor antagonism that blocks cholinergic bronchoconstriction, and beta-2 agonist-driven smooth muscle relaxation in one Aerosphere inhaler.
Saphnelo
anifrolumab
- Modality
- Fully human IgG1κ monoclonal antibody
- FY2025 sales
- $686m
- Key patent expiry
- 2033–2036 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Binds subunit 1 of the type I interferon receptor and induces its internalisation, blocking signalling by IFN-α, IFN-β and IFN-κ and downregulating the interferon gene signature that drives lupus inflammation.
Pulmicort
budesonide
- Modality
- Inhaled corticosteroid
- FY2025 sales
- $518m
- Key patent expiry
- Expired
- Status
- Marketed — off patent
Mechanism of action
A high-affinity glucocorticoid receptor agonist that represses pro-inflammatory transcription factors (NF-κB, AP-1) in airway cells, reducing cytokine release, mucosal oedema and bronchial hyperresponsiveness.
Tezspire
tezepelumab
- Modality
- Human IgG2λ monoclonal antibody
- FY2025 sales
- $458m
- Key patent expiry
- 2033–2038 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Binds thymic stromal lymphopoietin and prevents it engaging the TSLP receptor complex, blocking the upstream epithelial alarmin that initiates multiple downstream allergic, eosinophilic and Th2-independent inflammatory cascades.
Airsupra
albuterol / budesonide
- Modality
- SABA/ICS rescue combination
- FY2025 sales
- $166m
- Key patent expiry
- 2030
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Albuterol rapidly stimulates beta-2 adrenergic receptors to relieve acute bronchoconstriction while co-delivered budesonide suppresses the underlying inflammatory exacerbation response.
Beyfortus
nirsevimab
- Modality
- Long-acting human IgG1κ monoclonal antibody
- FY2025 sales
- $281m
- Key patent expiry
- 2028–2040 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Binds a conserved epitope on the prefusion conformation of the RSV fusion (F) protein, locking it and preventing viral membrane fusion and cell entry; YTE Fc mutations extend half-life across an RSV season.
FluMist
live attenuated influenza vaccine
- Modality
- Live attenuated intranasal vaccine
- FY2025 sales
- $272m
- Key patent expiry
- 2025–2026 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Cold-adapted, temperature-sensitive influenza strains replicate in the nasopharynx but not the lower airway, eliciting mucosal IgA plus systemic humoral and cell-mediated immunity against matched influenza A and B strains.
Synagis
palivizumab
- Modality
- Humanised IgG1κ monoclonal antibody
- FY2025 sales
- —
- Key patent expiry
- Expired
- Status
- Marketed — off patent
Mechanism of action
Binds the A antigenic site of the RSV F glycoprotein, neutralising the virus and inhibiting fusion-mediated entry and syncytium formation in respiratory epithelium.
Ultomiris
ravulizumab
- Modality
- Long-acting humanised monoclonal antibody
- FY2025 sales
- $4.72bn
- Key patent expiry
- 2035–2041 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Binds complement protein C5 and blocks its cleavage to C5a and C5b, preventing terminal membrane-attack-complex formation; engineered Fc recycling gives an eight-week dosing interval.
Strensiq
asfotase alfa
- Modality
- Enzyme replacement therapy
- FY2025 sales
- $1.68bn
- Key patent expiry
- 2025–2038 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
A bone-targeted recombinant tissue-nonspecific alkaline phosphatase fusion protein that hydrolyses accumulated inorganic pyrophosphate, restoring the phosphate-to-pyrophosphate ratio needed for skeletal mineralisation.
Soliris
eculizumab
- Modality
- Humanised IgG2/4κ monoclonal antibody
- FY2025 sales
- $1.84bn
- Key patent expiry
- 2025–2032 (US, biosimilars entered)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Binds complement C5 with high affinity and prevents its cleavage, halting terminal complement activation and the intravascular haemolysis and endothelial injury it causes.
Koselugo
selumetinib
- Modality
- Small molecule — MEK1/2 inhibitor
- FY2025 sales
- $662m
- Key patent expiry
- 2026–2029 (US)
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
Allosterically inhibits MEK1 and MEK2 kinases, blocking ERK phosphorylation downstream of hyperactive RAS signalling caused by neurofibromin loss, which slows plexiform neurofibroma growth.
Voydeya
danicopan
- Modality
- Small molecule — Factor D inhibitor
- FY2025 sales
- —
- Key patent expiry
- 2035–2038
- Status
- Marketed
Mechanism of action
First-in-class oral inhibitor of complement Factor D, blocking alternative-pathway C3 convertase amplification and thereby controlling extravascular haemolysis that persists on C5 inhibitor therapy.
Zoladex
goserelin
- Modality
- GnRH receptor agonist depot
- FY2025 sales
- $1.11bn
- Key patent expiry
- Expired
- Status
- Marketed — off patent
Mechanism of action
A synthetic LHRH analogue that initially stimulates then, through sustained exposure, downregulates pituitary GnRH receptors, suppressing LH/FSH release and lowering testosterone or oestradiol to castrate levels.
Nexium
esomeprazole
- Modality
- Small molecule — proton pump inhibitor
- FY2025 sales
- —
- Key patent expiry
- Expired
- Status
- Marketed — off patent
Mechanism of action
The S-isomer of omeprazole accumulates in gastric parietal cells and covalently inhibits the H+/K+-ATPase proton pump, durably suppressing acid secretion.
Depth module
Segment Performance
Revenue, EBIT, margin and ROIC by therapy-area segment, with contribution mix and growth relative to the group.
Segments reported
5
FY2025 basis
Largest segment
Oncology
41.6% of revenue, 25.0% margin
Best ROIC
Oncology 16.4%
Only segment clearly above WACC
Harvest candidate
CVRM
2.1% growth into a 2026 LOE
Revenue contribution treemap
Segment revenue trend ($m)
| Segment | Revenue | EBIT | Margin | Growth | vs group | ROIC | Mix |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oncology | $23.76bn | $5.94bn | 25.0% | 11.2% | +5.6pp | 16.4% | 41.6% |
| CVRM | $14.02bn | $2.94bn | 21.0% | 2.1% | -3.5pp | 12.1% | 24.6% |
| R&I | $9.21bn | $1.66bn | 18.0% | 6.4% | +0.8pp | 9.8% | 16.1% |
| Rare Disease | $8.94bn | $1.52bn | 17.0% | 8.9% | +3.3pp | 5.2% | 15.7% |
| V&IT / Other | $1.15bn | $-0.18bn | -15.7% | -18.4% | -24.0pp | -2.1% | 2.0% |
Capital allocation recommendation
Oncology is the only segment earning meaningfully above cost of capital while growing double digits — it should absorb the marginal R&D dollar and it currently does (roughly 47% of pipeline programmes). CVRM is the harvest candidate: 2.1% growth into a 2026 Farxiga LOE with mid-teens ROIC, so the correct posture is cash extraction and lifecycle defence, not new investment. Rare Disease is the problem child — 8.9% growth is respectable but 5.2% ROIC sits below WACC because the invested-capital base is Alexion's purchase price; it needs three more years of compounding to clear the hurdle. Implication: the group ROIC story is an Oncology story with a Rare Disease drag, and it improves mechanically as Alexion intangibles amortise.
Module
Risk Analysis
Enterprise risk taxonomy from the Risk Supplement 2025 — 20 named risk factors across five categories, with plain-language summaries.
Risk categories
5
Named risk factors
20
Risk Supplement 2025
Largest category
Supply Chain
7 named factors
Smallest category
Economic
4 named factors
Named risk factors by category
Count of distinct risk headings disclosed within each category. Click a bar or card to expand.
Product Pipeline
2 named risk factors
- Failure or delay in pipeline delivery / new launches. Clinical, regulatory, or manufacturing setbacks at any development stage; speed-to-market is called out as especially critical in immuno-oncology given competitor trial volume.
- Failure to meet regulatory/ethical development standards. FDA, EMA, and other authorities can reject or delay approval, or demand further trials post-approval.
Commercialisation
2 named risk factors
- Pricing, affordability, access & competitive pressure. Cites the US Inflation Reduction Act, EU Joint Clinical Assessment, and rising calls for pooled procurement as active pressures on price.
- Failure to execute commercial strategy. Manufacturing capacity, diagnosis rates, prescribing-habit shifts, and IP erosion can all blunt commercial uptake even for approved products.
Supply Chain & Execution
7 named risk factors
- Supply of compliant, quality medicines. Unforecast demand spikes, natural disasters, and GMP/regulatory compliance actions can interrupt supply.
- IT / cybersecurity failure. Growing sophistication of attacks, increasingly AI-fuelled, against systems holding clinical, IP, and compliance data.
- Data & AI governance. New risk heading — covers both under-exploiting AI's R&D/manufacturing potential and the risks of scaling AI into sensitive decisions like clinical trials.
- Illegal trade (counterfeiting, diversion). Direct patient-safety risk in addition to reputational and financial harm.
- Reliance on third-party goods & services. A large share of annual cost sits with outsourced suppliers across the value chain.
- Failure of critical processes. War, pandemics, civil unrest, and extreme weather as compounding threats to operations.
- Workforce attraction & retention. Competition for specialised talent in a tight global market for life-sciences skills.
Legal, Regulatory & Compliance
5 named risk factors
- Safety/efficacy of marketed medicines questioned. Post-launch data is inherently more limited than trial data; adverse events can trigger recalls or liability claims.
- Litigation & governmental investigations. Manufacturing, marketing, and pricing practices are all subject to extensive regulatory oversight and potential civil/criminal action.
- IP risk. Patent challenges, compulsory licensing, and accelerated generic-approval policy all threaten the value of the patents mapped in Patent Expiry.
- Sustainability / environmental targets. Increasing investor and regulatory scrutiny of net-zero commitments and physical climate risk to operations.
- Anti-bribery, anti-fraud & compliance. Cites the UK Bribery Act, UK Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, and US FCPA as active enforcement regimes.
Economic & Financial
4 named risk factors
- Geopolitical / macroeconomic volatility. Inflation, FX swings, and trade barriers/tariffs across an 80+ country footprint.
- Failure to achieve strategic plans or targets. All forward guidance is explicitly flagged as assumption-dependent and inherently uncertain.
- Internal control failure or fraud. New UK 'failure to prevent fraud' offence raises the regulatory bar on internal control quality.
- Deterioration in financial position. Bundles FX exposure, counterparty/credit risk, goodwill & intangible impairment, pension solvency, insurance adequacy, and cross-border tax disputes.
Sector module
Macro & Geographic Exposure
Sensitivity of revenue, EBIT and EPS to rates, inflation, currency and trade policy, mapped against regional regulatory risk.
Largest EPS sensitivity
−4.6%
US tariff on imported drugs
FX exposure
57%
Revenue denominated outside USD
High regulatory-risk revenue
56.2%
US + China
Equity beta to S&P
0.44
5yr weekly correlation
Macro sensitivity tornado — EPS impact (%)
Trade policy, not interest rates, is the dominant macro variable. A 15% US import tariff costs more EPS than a 100bp rate rise and a 5% dollar move combined.
| Region | Revenue | Reg. risk | Driver |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | 43.1% | High | IRA negotiation, Section 232 tariff review, PBM reform. |
| Europe | 20.4% | Medium | EU pharma package shortens regulatory data protection. |
| China | 13.1% | High | VBP tenders, NRDL price cuts, compliance enforcement. |
| Emerging ex-China | 14.8% | Medium | FX volatility and local-content requirements. |
| Japan / Established RoW | 8.6% | Low | Biennial price revisions, predictable. |
5-year correlation to macro factors
| Scenario | Revenue | EBIT | EPS | Transmission mechanism |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest rates +100bps | 0% | -0.4% | -1.9% | Only $4.7bn of debt reprices within twelve months; the equity-duration effect on the multiple dominates the P&L effect. |
| Inflation +1% | 0.3% | -1.1% | -1.6% | Input and labour costs reprice faster than drug prices, which are contractually or politically capped. |
| USD +5% (trade-weighted) | -2.6% | -2.9% | -3.4% | 57% of revenue is non-USD against a partially non-USD cost base. |
| CNY −5% | -0.7% | -0.8% | -0.9% | 13.1% China revenue with local manufacturing offsetting roughly a third. |
| EUR −5% | -1% | -0.9% | -1% | Largely naturally hedged by the European cost base. |
| GDP growth −1% | -0.4% | -0.5% | -0.6% | Prescription pharmaceutical demand is close to inelastic; exposure is via emerging-market self-pay volumes. |
| US tariff on imported drugs (15%) | 0% | -3.8% | -4.6% | The largest single policy exposure; partly mitigated by the $3.5bn US manufacturing commitment. |
Macro read-through
The portfolio is close to demand-inelastic — a 1% GDP shock moves EPS by 0.6% — so the macro risk here is political and currency-based, not cyclical. Fifty-six percent of revenue sits in the two jurisdictions actively rewriting drug pricing rules.
Implication: hedge the position for policy, not for the cycle. The $3.5bn US manufacturing commitment is best read as a tariff hedge with a physical-asset cost, and it should be assessed against the 4.6% EPS exposure it is designed to neutralise.
Pharex Exclusive
Product Pipeline
198 active programmes across five therapy-area segments, phase distribution, and the disclosed 2026 catalyst calendar. Compiled from AstraZeneca's Development Pipeline as at 10 February 2026.
Active programmes
198
As at 10 Feb 2026
Phase III / Pivotal
44
Life-cycle management
73
Therapy area segments
5
Pipeline depth by segment and phase
Oncology dominates by volume — largely driven by combination-therapy expansion of already-approved assets (Imfinzi, Enhertu, Datroway) rather than pure new-molecule risk.
Near-term catalyst calendar
Distribution of disclosed data readouts / submission milestones across Phase III+ and LCM programmes.
Oncology
122 programmes- Phase I
- 23
- Phase II
- 19
- Phase III / Pivotal
- 26
- Life-Cycle Mgmt
- 54
Disclosed catalysts
- ·Enhertu · DESTINY-Lung04 (H1 2026)
- ·Imfinzi · NILE, VOLGA, EMERALD-2/3 (H1–H2 2026)
- ·camizestrant · SERENA-4 (H2 2026)
- ·Lynparza · MONO-OLA1 (H2 2026)
Click to view catalysts
CVRM
23 programmes- Phase I
- 7
- Phase II
- 7
- Phase III / Pivotal
- 8
- Life-Cycle Mgmt
- 1
Disclosed catalysts
- ·Wainua · ATTR-CM readout (H2 2026)
- ·baxdrostat · BaxHTN (filing accepted)
Click to view catalysts
R&I
31 programmes- Phase I
- 7
- Phase II
- 7
- Phase III / Pivotal
- 4
- Life-Cycle Mgmt
- 13
Disclosed catalysts
- ·tozorakimab · OBERON/TITANIA/PROSPERO (H1 2026)
- ·tozorakimab · TILIA (H2 2026)
- ·Breztri · ATHLOS (H1 2026)
Click to view catalysts
Rare Disease
18 programmes- Phase I
- 4
- Phase II
- 4
- Phase III / Pivotal
- 5
- Life-Cycle Mgmt
- 5
Disclosed catalysts
- ·efzimfotase alfa · HICKORY/MULBERRY/CHESTNUT (H1 2026)
- ·Ultomiris · I CAN, HSCT-TMA (H1 2026)
- ·gefurulimab · PREVAIL (filing accepted)
Click to view catalysts
Vaccines & IT
4 programmes- Phase I
- 0
- Phase II
- 3
- Phase III / Pivotal
- 1
- Life-Cycle Mgmt
- 0
Disclosed catalysts
- ·No 2026-dated catalysts disclosed — Kavigale (SUPERNOVA) already launched
Click to view catalysts
Pharex Exclusive
Patent Expiry
Exclusivity timeline and generic-erosion exposure across 25 key marketed products, with US/EU/China/Japan expiry windows mapped against 2025 sales.
2025 sales tracked
$49.4bn
25 key marketed products
US share of sales
~44%
US LOE by 2027
7 products
Near-term exposure
US LOE 2033+
8 products
Long-dated protection
Patent cliff risk map
X-axis = earliest US patent/exclusivity expiry · Y-axis = 2025 total product sales ($m) · bubble size = revenue at risk. Products sitting high and to the left carry the nearest, highest-value exposure.
2025 sales: US vs rest-of-world, by segment
CVRM and Oncology are the most ex-US-weighted segments; Rare Disease and R&I skew toward the US.
Full product detail
Sorted by nearest US exclusivity expiry. Near-term ≤2027 · Medium 2028–2032 · Long-term 2033+
| Product | Segment | US | EU | China | Japan | US sales | Ex-US sales | Total | Risk tier |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Brilinta/Brilique | CVRM | 2025 | 2025 | 2037 | 2025 | $393m | $430m | $823m | Near-term |
| Wainua/Wainzua | CVRM | 2025 | 2034 | 2034 | 2034 | $204m | $8m | $212m | Near-term |
| Saphnelo | R&I | 2025 | 2025 | 2025 | 2030 | $596m | $90m | $686m | Near-term |
| Symbicort | R&I | 2025 | — | — | — | $1193m | $1692m | $2.88bn | Near-term |
| FluMist | Vaccines & IT | 2025 | 2025 | 2025 | 2025 | $28m | $244m | $272m | Near-term |
| Strensiq | Rare Disease | 2025 | 2028 | 2025 | — | $1332m | $346m | $1.68bn | Near-term |
| Calquence | Oncology | 2026 | 2032 | 2032 | 2037 | $2339m | $1179m | $3.52bn | Near-term |
| Farxiga/Forxiga | CVRM | 2026 | 2028 | 2027 | 2025 | $1730m | $6670m | $8.40bn | Near-term |
| Lynparza | Oncology | 2027 | 2029 | 2027 | 2029 | $1434m | $1845m | $3.28bn | Near-term |
| Soliris | Rare Disease | 2027 | 2027 | 2029 | 2029 | $1092m | $745m | $1.84bn | Near-term |
| Truqap | Oncology | 2028 | 2028 | 2028 | 2033 | $586m | $142m | $728m | Medium |
| Fasenra | R&I | 2028 | 2025 | 2028 | 2025 | $1195m | $786m | $1.98bn | Medium |
| Beyfortus | Vaccines & IT | 2028 | 2035 | 2038 | 2035 | $184m | $97m | $281m | Medium |
| Koselugo | Rare Disease | 2028 | 2029 | 2026 | 2029 | $219m | $443m | $662m | Medium |
| Airsupra | R&I | 2030 | 2030 | 2030 | — | $162m | $4m | $166m | Medium |
| Breztri/Trixeo | R&I | 2030 | 2030 | 2030 | 2030 | $614m | $585m | $1.20bn | Medium |
| Imfinzi | Oncology | 2031 | 2030 | 2030 | 2033 | $3509m | $2554m | $6.06bn | Medium |
| Tagrisso | Oncology | 2032 | 2032 | 2032 | 2034 | $3064m | $4190m | $7.25bn | Medium |
| Lokelma | CVRM | 2032 | 2032 | 2033 | 2035 | $301m | $397m | $698m | Medium |
| Enhertu | Oncology | 2033 | 2033 | 2033 | — | — | $977m | $977m | Long-term |
| Tezspire | R&I | 2033 | 2028 | 2028 | 2028 | — | $458m | $458m | Long-term |
| Datroway | Oncology | 2034 | 2034 | 2034 | — | — | $2m | $2m | Long-term |
| Imjudo | Oncology | 2034 | 2026 | 2026 | 2031 | $227m | $119m | $346m | Long-term |
| Ultomiris | Rare Disease | 2035 | 2035 | 2035 | 2038 | $2667m | $2051m | $4.72bn | Long-term |
| Roxadustat | CVRM | — | — | 2033 | — | — | $274m | $274m | N/A |
Pharex Exclusive
Quantified Risk Matrix
Named risks sized on likelihood and impact, each with a quantified exposure, historical precedent and existing mitigant.
Composite risk score
6.1 / 10
Moderate-High
Risks tracked
10
Sized and evidenced
High-severity
2
Likelihood × impact ≥ 15
Revenue at policy risk
56.2%
US + China combined
Likelihood × impact matrix — click a marker
Farxiga LOE + IRA price negotiation
- Quantified exposure
- $8.4bn, 14.7% of revenue
- Historical precedent
- Crestor lost 90% of US revenue within 18 months of 2016 LOE.
- Existing mitigant
- Combination positioning in CKD/HF and 2026 pricing already partly reset.
| Risk | Category | L × I | Exposure | Mitigant |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Farxiga LOE + IRA price negotiation | Regulatory | 20 | $8.4bn, 14.7% of revenue | Combination positioning in CKD/HF and 2026 pricing already partly reset. |
| ADC pipeline single-readout dependency | Pipeline | 15 | ~$11bn of peak-sales expectation | Four independent ADC programmes; Daiichi Sankyo cost-sharing. |
| China policy — VBP expansion and compliance | Geographic | 12 | 13.1% of revenue | Local manufacturing footprint; portfolio shifted toward innovative assets. |
| US tariff / drug-import policy | Regulatory | 9 | 43% of revenue is US | $3.5bn announced US manufacturing investment. |
| Alexion goodwill impairment | Accounting | 8 | $21.5bn goodwill, 18% of assets | Ultomiris conversion running ahead of plan at $4.7bn. |
| Single-source biologics supply | Supply chain | 8 | ADC conjugation is single-site for two products | Second-site qualification underway through 2026. |
| FX translation (GBP/USD, CNY, EUR) | FX | 8 | 57% of revenue non-USD | Natural hedge via non-USD cost base; no speculative hedging. |
| Refinancing at higher coupons | Leverage | 6 | $25.0bn total debt, $4.7bn current | 9.4x interest cover; laddered maturities to 2050. |
| Litigation and product liability | Litigation | 6 | Undisclosed; provisions of ~$1.1bn | No single case currently sized above 1% of market cap. |
| Payer / distributor concentration | Counterparty | 6 | Top 3 US distributors ~41% of US revenue | Investment-grade counterparties; no historical loss. |
The three risks most likely to move the stock
- 01Farxiga LOE and IRA negotiation is the only risk that is both near-certain and large: $8.4bn of revenue repricing across 2026–28. It is the single biggest determinant of whether FY2027 revenue grows at all.
- 02ADC readout dependency is lower probability but the largest single-event impact — roughly 40% of our target price rests on two data packages landing inside twelve months.
- 03China is the risk most likely to be mispriced by the market: 13% of revenue exposed to a policy regime that has already produced both price resets and criminal investigations at this company specifically.
Pharex Exclusive
Competitive Landscape
Where the company sits in the large-cap pharmaceutical hierarchy on revenue share and composite positioning.
Competitive rank
#3 of 9
Composite positioning score
Positioning score
79 / 100
Pipeline, moat, growth, returns
Revenue share of peer set
11.4%
Of $494bn peer revenue
Concentration
Fragmented
No peer above 15% share
Share of peer-set revenue (%)
Composite positioning score
| Rank | Company | Score | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| #1 | Eli Lilly | 88 | Incretin franchise is the largest revenue pool in pharma history; valuation is the only debate. |
| #2 | Novo Nordisk | 84 | Best margins and returns in the sector, but single-franchise concentration is now a genuine risk. |
| #3 | AstraZeneca | 79 | Deepest pipeline in European pharma with the cleanest balance sheet; ranked below the incretin duo purely on current profitability. |
| #4 | Novartis | 76 | Excellent execution and margin discipline; growth durability past 2027 is unproven. |
| #5 | Merck & Co. | 72 | Superb economics today, but Keytruda at ~46% of revenue makes 2028 a cliff, not a step. |
| #6 | Roche | 68 | Diagnostics ballast and strong returns offset by three consecutive years of pipeline disappointment. |
| #7 | Sanofi | 63 | Dupixent is excellent; everything around it grows below sector average. |
| #8 | GSK | 58 | Cheap for reasons — vaccine volatility and litigation overhang cap the multiple. |
| #9 | Pfizer | 52 | Post-COVID normalisation is complete but the replacement growth engine has not yet appeared. |
Positioning read-through
AstraZeneca ranks third of nine, and the two companies above it are there on current profitability rather than on pipeline depth or balance-sheet capacity — both of which AstraZeneca leads. The gap to Lilly and Novo is an incretin gap, not a franchise-quality gap.
Implication: the relevant comparison for a 2026 entry is not against the incretin duo, whose multiples already discount a decade of growth, but against Merck and Roche, where AstraZeneca offers a materially younger revenue base at a similar multiple.
Pharex Exclusive
Peer Comparison
Benchmarking against eight large-cap pharmaceutical peers across growth, margin, return and valuation, with median-relative positioning.
Peer set — sector + market-cap band, click to include or exclude
| Company | Revenue | Growth | Gross % | EBIT % | Net % | ROE | ROIC | P/E | EV/EBITDA | D/E | FCF % | Mkt cap |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AstraZeneca AZN | $57.1bn | 5.6% | 73.7% | 16.2% | 15.3% | 18.1% | 10.1% | 13.9x | 17.7x | 0.52x | 17.6% | $243bn |
| Merck & Co. MRK | $64.2bn | 2.1% | 76.3% | 30.4% | 26.6% | 38.2% | 19.4% | 12.1x | 9.8x | 0.72x | 24.1% | $226bn |
| Pfizer PFE | $63.6bn | 1.4% | 70.1% | 21.7% | 12.9% | 10.4% | 6.1% | 10.6x | 8.9x | 0.74x | 15.2% | $149bn |
| Novartis NVS | $54.2bn | 8.2% | 77.4% | 31.2% | 26.1% | 31.6% | 18.2% | 15.4x | 11.6x | 0.61x | 26.4% | $231bn |
| Roche ROG | $68.3bn | 6.1% | 74.8% | 26.9% | 19.4% | 41.7% | 16.8% | 14.8x | 10.4x | 1.18x | 21.7% | $268bn |
| Eli Lilly LLY | $58.9bn | 32.4% | 81.2% | 33.8% | 24.9% | 62.4% | 24.1% | 42.6x | 31.2x | 1.94x | 12.4% | $742bn |
| Novo Nordisk NVO | $45.8bn | 14.6% | 84.6% | 43.1% | 33.9% | 78.2% | 34.6% | 17.8x | 12.9x | 0.42x | 27.8% | $268bn |
| Sanofi SNY | $46.7bn | 6.8% | 72.9% | 22.4% | 15.1% | 10.8% | 7.9% | 12.4x | 9.1x | 0.28x | 14.6% | $129bn |
| GSK GSK | $40.1bn | 5.2% | 72.1% | 24.6% | 14.8% | 24.1% | 12.4% | 11.2x | 8.4x | 1.06x | 16.2% | $92bn |
| Peer median | $55.6bn | 6.1% | 74.8% | 26.9% | 19.4% | 31.6% | 16.8% | 13.9x | 10.4x | 0.74x | 21.7% | $231bn |
Relative positioning — percentile vs peer set
Dimension read-through
- Growth5.6% FY2025 growth after an 18% FY2024; three-year CAGR of 13.1% still tops the median.
- Margin16.2% reported EBIT margin is the weakest in the set on GAAP; ~33% on a core basis.
- ReturnsROIC of 10.1% trails a 16.8% median because Alexion goodwill inflates invested capital.
- Balance sheet0.52x debt/equity and 1.16x net debt/EBITDA are the second-strongest in the group.
- Cash generation17.6% FCF margin is below median but the fastest-improving line in the peer set.
- Valuation13.9x trailing earnings versus a 13.9x median with a superior growth rate — a free option.
- R&D intensity24.4% of revenue reinvested, second only to Merck; the source of the margin gap.
- Pipeline depth198 active programmes with 30 Phase III assets — the deepest in European pharma.
AI Commentary
Where AstraZeneca leads
- Balance-sheet strength: net debt/EBITDA of 1.16x versus a 1.9x peer median, achieved without asset sales.
- Reinvestment: 24.4% of revenue into R&D — 620bps above the peer median and the direct cause of pipeline depth.
- Growth-adjusted valuation: 13.9x trailing earnings for a mid-teens three-year revenue CAGR is the cheapest PEG in the set.
Where it lags
- Reported EBIT margin of 16.2% against a 26.9% median — 1,070bps of gap, of which roughly 850bps is Alexion intangible amortisation and the balance genuine R&D intensity.
- ROIC of 10.1% versus 16.8%: the numerator is competitive, the denominator carries $59.7bn of goodwill and intangibles.
- FCF margin of 17.6% versus 21.7%: launch-stage working capital and capex on the biologics network are the drag.
Hypothesis: AstraZeneca screens as a low-margin, low-return pharma on GAAP and as a high-growth, well-capitalised compounder on economics. The bridge between the two readings is entirely accounting for the Alexion acquisition plus a deliberate reinvestment rate. Peers that screen better — Novartis, Merck — are harvesting; AZN is building. Implication: the multiple should re-rate as amortisation rolls off from FY2027 and the ADC franchise scales, but only if R&D intensity falls below 22% on rising revenue rather than through cuts.
Pharex Exclusive — Flagship
Pharex Pharma Score
Three proprietary, concentration- and patent-timing-aware scores built entirely from this company's own disclosed data — designed to show durability risk that standard financial ratios don't capture.
PCEI — Patent Cliff Exposure Index
0–100, higher = more exposed
52.3
19 products with nearest expiry inside 5 years
Provisional score — modality-weighted, not yet probability/severity adjusted. See methodology note.
AI Commentary
Farxiga/Forxiga's 2025 expiry accounts for 28% of this score, on 8.4bn of disclosed sales at a 1.0× modality weight.
PCRI — Product Concentration Risk Index
0–100, higher = more concentrated
8.5
vs. simple concentration: 38.0%
AI Commentary
Risk-weighted concentration is 8.5 against an unweighted top-3 share of 38.0%. The gap reflects how soon the largest franchises lose protection — each product's squared revenue share is multiplied by 1.5 (expiry ≤3y), 1.0 (4–7y) or 0.6 (8y+ or already off patent).
RRI — Revenue Resilience Index
0–100, higher = more resilient
86.7
Basic version — concentration & diversification only
AI Commentary
Therapy area concentration is the biggest drag, scoring 79 on an HHI of 2,846.
Full methodology & assumptions
These are Pharex's own proprietary scores, not third-party ratings. All three are provisional and are computed only from this company's own disclosed financial and product data already shown elsewhere on this page. They have not yet been back-tested against realized outcomes and should be treated as directional, not predictive. Modality weights, risk multipliers, and the HHI-to-score conversion are Pharex's starting assumptions and are subject to recalibration.
Pharex Exclusive
Valuation Lab
Five independent valuation methods on one football field, blended to a fair value and stress-tested with a 10,000-path simulation.
Blended fair value
$90.80
Weighted across 5 methods
Margin of safety
13.7%
Range $77.6–$106.5
P(above spot)
78%
10,000-path simulation
Football field — value per share by method
Every method except the dividend discount model lands above the current price. The DDM is the outlier by construction: it penalises a company that deliberately reinvests rather than distributes.
| Method | Value | Weight |
|---|---|---|
| DCF (7.8% WACC, 2.5% g) Base case; most sensitive to terminal margin. | $92.50 | 35% |
| Trading comps (14.6x fwd EPS) Peer median forward multiple applied to FY2026E core EPS of $6.12. | $89.40 | 25% |
| Precedent transactions (4.9x sales) Large-cap pharma deals 2019–2025 at a control premium. | $96.80 | 10% |
| Dividend discount model Understates value because payout is deliberately low against reinvestment. | $71.20 | 10% |
| Residual income (7.8% WACC) Captures the ROIC–WACC spread turning positive from FY2024. | $94.10 | 20% |
| Blended fair value | $90.80 | 100% |
Monte Carlo value distribution (10,000 paths)
Valuation verdict
The blended fair value of $90.80 implies 13.7% upside from $78.42. The distribution matters more than the point estimate: 78% of simulated paths finish above spot, but the P10 of $68.4 sits 13% below the current price, so the downside tail is real rather than theoretical.
Implication: this is a margin-of-safety case, not a mispricing case. The asymmetry only becomes compelling below $72, where every method except the DDM implies more than 25% upside.
Pharex Exclusive
Capital Allocation
Where operating cash goes, the returns earned on major acquisitions, and a weighted scorecard of management's capital discipline.
FY2025 CFO
$14.1bn
+15.5% YoY
Reinvestment rate
49.0%
CapEx + R&D / CFO
Shareholder return
$5.0bn
Dividends only — no buyback
Capital discipline grade
B+
Weighted score 7.4 / 10
FY2025 cash deployment waterfall
Where every dollar of operating cash went. A flat net cash build means the business is fully deploying what it earns.
Five-year deployment mix ($m)
2021 is off-scale by design — the $39bn Alexion purchase dwarfs every other decision management has made this decade.
Dividend per share ($) and cover
- Yield
- 2.08%
- Payout (core)
- 35.6%
- FCF cover
- 2x
- Growth streak
- 4 yrs
Buybacks
AstraZeneca has not repurchased shares since 2012. Share count rose 15.6% since FY2020, almost entirely the Alexion equity consideration. The absence of buybacks is a deliberate choice to fund R&D and bolt-ons; with net debt/EBITDA at 1.16x, the first authorisation is now a realistic 2026 possibility and would be the clearest signal that management believes the pipeline is funded.
| Target | Year | Price paid | Strategic rationale | Return impact | Grade |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alexion Pharmaceuticals | 2021 | $39.0bn | Entry into rare disease / complement biology; diversification away from oncology concentration. | Dilutive to group ROIC by ~340bps; revenue contribution has since grown at a 12% CAGR to ~$9.8bn. | B- |
| CinCor Pharma | 2023 | $1.3bn | Baxdrostat — first-in-class aldosterone synthase inhibitor for resistant hypertension. | Pre-revenue; Phase III readout is the value test. | B+ |
| Gracell Biotechnologies | 2024 | $1.2bn | Cell therapy platform (FasTCAR) in haematology and autoimmune disease. | Pre-revenue platform bet; optionality rather than near-term return. | B |
| Fusion Pharmaceuticals | 2024 | $2.4bn | Radioconjugates — extends the ADC playbook into targeted radiotherapy. | Pre-revenue; adjacency to an existing capability lowers integration risk. | A- |
| EsoBiotec | 2025 | $1.0bn | In-vivo cell therapy engineering, removing ex-vivo manufacturing cost. | Pre-revenue; strategically coherent with Gracell. | B+ |
Capital allocation scorecard
B+
| Component | Weight | Score | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Buyback timing / value creation | 10% | 5/10 | No programme to judge. Neutral rather than negative — capital went to R&D at a higher marginal return. |
| Dividend sustainability | 15% | 8/10 | 2.0x FCF cover and a 35.6% core payout leave room to grow the DPS through a patent-cliff year. |
| M&A track record | 20% | 6/10 | Alexion was expensive and diluted ROIC; the 2023–25 bolt-ons are small, cheap and strategically adjacent. |
| R&D efficiency | 20% | 8/10 | $4.10 of revenue per $1 of trailing three-year R&D, versus $3.60 peer median. The spend converts. |
| CapEx discipline | 10% | 7/10 | 7.2% of revenue, elevated for biologics capacity build-out; incremental ROIC on new capex is ~13%. |
| Debt management | 15% | 9/10 | De-levered from 3.1x to 1.16x on EBITDA growth alone, terming out maturities at pre-2022 coupons. |
| Working capital efficiency | 10% | 8/10 | −358 day cash conversion cycle self-funds growth; the risk is the reversal if growth stalls. |
AI Commentary
Capital discipline is strong on the financing side and mixed on the acquisition side. The grade is held back by Alexion's purchase price rather than by anything management is doing today.
The most informative number here is the reinvestment rate: 49% of operating cash goes back into capex and R&D versus a 34% peer median, and only 36% is returned to shareholders. That is a growth company's allocation policy run inside a dividend-paying large cap. Implication: the shareholder-return debate resolves in 2026 — with leverage at 1.16x, a first buyback authorisation is the cleanest available signal that management believes the pipeline is fully funded. Its absence beyond FY2026 would suggest it is not.
Pharex Exclusive
Economic Moat
Seven sources of competitive advantage scored on evidence, benchmarked against peers and tracked for direction of travel.
Moat rating
Narrow
Wide / Narrow / None
Composite score
6.4 / 10
Weighted across 7 sources
Trend
Widening
5-year direction
Durability horizon
10–12 yrs
Excess-return persistence
Moat dimensions — AstraZeneca PLC vs peer average
Moat score trend (5yr)
The crossover in FY2024 is the modality shift showing up in the score: biologics and ADCs carry longer effective exclusivity than the small-molecule base they replaced.
| Moat source | Score | Evidence | Trend |
|---|---|---|---|
| Patents / IP | 9/10 | Composition-of-matter protection on Tagrisso to 2032 and Enhertu to 2034; 198-programme pipeline continuously refreshes exclusivity. | stable |
| Regulatory barriers | 9/10 | Biologics and ADCs face BLA-level manufacturing scrutiny; biosimilar entry lags small-molecule generics by 3–5 years. | widening |
| Brand strength | 6/10 | Prescriber-level brand equity in oncology is real but transfers with the data, not the logo. | stable |
| Switching costs | 7/10 | Oncology regimens are rarely switched mid-line; companion diagnostics (EGFR, HER2-low) lock the protocol to the molecule. | widening |
| Cost advantage / scale | 6/10 | $4.4bn biologics network gives unit-cost advantage in ADCs, offset by China VBP price resets. | stable |
| Network effects | 3/10 | Weak by sector nature; partial effect via trial-site relationships and the Daiichi Sankyo alliance. | stable |
| Pricing power | 5/10 | US list-price growth of ~2%/yr with volume up 11% — price is not doing the work. IRA negotiation touches Farxiga from 2026. | eroding |
Pricing power test — price vs volume contribution to growth (%)
The honest test of pricing power is whether volume holds when price rises. Here price has been flat to negative while volume compounds — durable demand, but no pricing lever in reserve.
Moat verdict
AstraZeneca earns a Narrow rather than Wide moat: its durability is asset-by-asset (patents, regulatory hurdles, protocol lock-in) rather than franchise-wide. What tips the trend to widening is the modality mix — the shift from small molecules toward ADCs and biologics extends the effective exclusivity window by three to five years per asset and raises the manufacturing barrier for entrants. The offsetting erosion is pricing: IRA negotiation and China VBP mean the company must grow on volume, which it currently does. Implication: underwrite the pipeline, not the price list.
